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Abstract This paper addresses a problem that arises when it comes to inferring
deterministic causal chains from pertinent empirical data. It will be shown that to
every deterministic chain there exists an empirically equivalent common cause
structure. Thus, our overall conviction that deterministic chains are one of the most
ubiquitous (macroscopic) causal structures is underdetermined by empirical data. It
will be argued that even though the chain and its associated common cause model
are empirically equivalent there exists an important asymmetry between the two
models with respect to model expansions. This asymmetry might constitute a basis
on which to disambiguate corresponding causal inferences on non-empirical
grounds.
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1 Introduction
No later than (Frydenberg 1990), (Verma and Pearl 1991), and (Spirtes et al. 2000)
the fact that empirical data often considerably underdetermines causal inferences—
especially when it comes to inferences to complex causal structures—has become a
widely recognized and investigated problem in the literature on (algorithmic) causal
reasoning. All of these studies endorse a theoretical framework according to which
causal structures can be analyzed in terms of Bayesian networks.1 This framework
has meanwhile become the dominant approach to algorithmic causal reasoning in
the philosophical literature. Algorithms designed to uncover causal Bayesian
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networks—henceforth BN-algorithms, for short—analyze probabilistic input data,
i.e. probability distributions that are, for instance, acquired from frequency
distributions. As Sect. 2 is going to illustrate, the mapping of causal structures to
probability distributions is not generally unambiguous. In many cases more than one
structure is assigned to one probability distribution by BN-algorithms. Such
ambiguities are not normally considered to be particularly surprising or worrisome
in the literature, for, clearly, the causal inferences licensed by empirical data
crucially hinge on the latter’s quality, which in case of probabilistic data can be
negatively affected by ever so many factors. For instance, frequency distributions
may feature a considerable amount of confounding noise. As long as not all relevant
factors involved in an investigated causal structure are controlled for in the set-up of
a pertinent study, corresponding data tends to be confounded by hidden variables
and is, hence, likely not to unambiguously reflect underlying causal structures. If
ambiguities in causal reasoning can at least partially be ascribed to confounding
noise, the ambiguity ratio of a particular frequency distribution can simply be
understood as an indicator of how close the set-up behind a study has come to an
ideal noise-free set-up.
This raises the question as to whether it is possible to unambiguously infer
complex causal structures from data that has been collected against (idealized)
homogeneous causal backgrounds without confounding noise, i.e. from data that
directly exhibits deterministic dependencies among specific configurations of
variables, or whether inferences to causal structures—both of the probabilistic or the
deterministic type—are underdetermined by empirical data in principle. This is one
of the core questions addressed in this paper. While, since the early 1990ies, all the
studies concerned with ambiguous causal inferences have been focussing on
ambiguities affecting the causal interpretation of probabilistic data, this paper
investigates whether similar ambiguities arise in case of deterministic systems.
Addressing this question is not only relevant for determining whether the empirical
underdetermination of causal inferences is a matter of principle or merely a
consequence of unsuitable or noisy data. It is also of relevance to those areas of
causal research that are in fact analyzing deterministic data, such as studies
conducted in fully controlled laboratory contexts or so-called narrow case or small-
N studies in social sciences.2
As is well known, algorithms uncovering causal Bayesian networks are not
applicable to deterministic structures that are investigated on a sufficiently fine-
grained level such that deterministic dependencies actually show up in the data,
because such systems violate one of the fundamental assumptions of the BN-
framework: causal faithfulness.3 Before we can thus address the primary question of
this paper, the basics of a Boolean procedure of causal reasoning, which is custom-
built for the analysis of deterministic structures, are introduced in Sect. 3. Section 4
then shows that even data that has been collected against a noise-free causal
background such that deterministic dependencies are exhibited cannot always
2 Cf. (Ragin 1987), (Ragin 2000), or (Mahoney 2000).
3 Cf. e.g. (Spirtes et al. 2000), pp. 53–57, (Glymour 2007). The causal faithfulness assumption is also
briefly reviewed in Sect. 2 below.
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unambiguously be assigned to causal structures. In fact, we shall find that there
exists a systematic empirical underdetermination of inferences to one specific
structure: deterministic chains. It will turn out that whenever deterministic data
could be modeled in terms of a causal chain, it could equally be modeled in terms of
a common cause structure. To every deterministic chain there exists an empirically
equivalent common cause structure. This is what I shall dub the causal chain
problem. The paper concludes by indicating an important asymmetry between
modeling deterministic data in terms of a chain and a common cause structure,
respectively. Even though the deterministic chain and common cause models are
empirically equivalent they behave radically differently under model expansions.
2 Probabilistic Indistinguishability
In order to determine how causal structures and probability distributions are
connected, the causal discovery algorithms developed in the BN-framework impose
two important constraints on the structures and the probabilistic data they generate:
The structures and the data must satisfy the conditions expressed in the causal
Markov assumption and in the faithfulness assumption.4 The causal Markov
assumption states that in a probability distribution P generated by a (acyclic)5 causal
structure S a variable Z is independent of all its non-effects in S conditional on all of
Z’s direct causes, provided that no direct common causes of any two variables in S
are left out of P. According to the faithfulness assumption, there are no other
conditional independence relations in P than the ones implied by the causal Markov
assumption. As this section is going to briefly review, probability distributions are
not unambiguously connected to causal structures by these two assumptions.
Such as to illustrate the ambiguities that arise when it comes to causally
analyzing probabilistic data consider the structures (a), (b) and (c) graphed in Fig. 1.
If these structures are causally Markov and faithful, they generate probability
distributions that exhibit identical conditional independence relations. The three
variables or factors contained in these structures are positively correlated except for
A and C being independent given B in all three structures, i.e. pðA jB ^ CÞ ¼
pðA jBÞ. (a), (b) and (c), hence, are Markov equivalent or probabilistically
indistinguishable, respectively.6 They constitute a Markov equivalence class.
Structures in a Markov equivalence class cannot be discerned by BN-algorithms.
If indistinguishable structures are suitably extended by further variables,
ambiguities may disappear. For instance, structures (a1) and (c1) in Fig. 1 are such
disambiguating extensions of (a) and (c), respectively. Provided that (c1) is causally
Markov and faithful, it, for example, gives rise to a dependence of A and E, i.e.
p(A | E) [ p(A), which is not the case for (a1). However, not all extensions of
4 Cf. e.g. (Spirtes et al. 2000), pp. 29-31, (Glymour 1997, 2007). While constraint based BN-algorithms
categorically rule out unfaithful structures, metric procedures merely rank them low (Cf. (Neapolitan
2004)).
5 Both Boolean and BN-methodologies are designed to uncover acyclic structures only. The causal
structures considered in the following are hence implicitly assumed not to feature feedbacks.
6 Cf. e.g. (Pearl 2000), pp. 19, 145, (Verma and Pearl 1991).
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Markov equivalents resolve ambiguities, as extensions (a2) and (c2) of (a) and (c)
illustrate. Even though (a2) and (c2) are probabilistically distinguishable from (a)
and (c), they are again contained in one and the same Markov equivalence class, as
they induce identical conditional independence relations among their variables.
(Frydenberg 1990) and (Verma and Pearl 1991) have shown that probabilistic
indistinguishability can be nicely captured in graphical terms: Two directed acyclic
graphs G1 and G2 represent two probabilistically indistinguishable causally Markov
and faithful causal structures iff (i) G1 and G2 have the same vertex set; (ii) G1 and
G2 have the same adjacencies; and (iii) G1 and G2 have the same unshielded
colliders, where an unshielded collider is constituted by two edges that collide at the
same vertex and whose tails are not adjacent.7
Countless causal structures are probabilistically indistinguishable in this sense
and, accordingly, many causal inferences drawn on the basis of probabilistic data
are ambiguous. There are several proposals in the literature as to how to
disambiguate the causal interpretation of probabilistic data. Broadly, these proposals
can be grouped into two categories. The first category is constituted by suggestions
to the effect that structures as (a), (b) and (c) or (a2) and (c2) should be discerned by
drawing on additional empirical information such as temporal orderings of token
events that instantiate the event types involved in these structures.8 The
disambiguation approaches contained in the second category resort to established
causal knowledge about the specific structure under investigation, as e.g. knowledge
about how to manipulate a particular structure in a systematic way.9
(a) (b) (c) (a1) (c1) (a2) (c2)
m m m m
Fig. 1 (a), (b), and (c) represent three Markov equivalent causal structures—that equivalence being
symbolized by ‘‘ m ’’. Suitable extensions of graphs (a) and (c) yield graphs (a1) and (c1), which are not
Markov equivalent. Not all extensions of (a), (b) and (c), however, resolve equivalencies. This is
illustrated by extensions (a2) and (c2)
7 Cf. also (Spirtes et al. 2000) and (Glymour 1997). Two vertices V1 and V2 are said to be adjacent in a
graph G iff there is an edge between V1 and V2 in G. In a directed edge from a vertex V1 to a vertex V2, V1
is called the tail and V2 the head. Two edges collide at a vertex V1 iff V1 is the head of both edges.
8 Cf. e.g. (Suppes 1970).
9 Cf. (Spirtes et al. 2000), ch. 4, (Pearl 2000), or (Woodward 2003), ch. 3.
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As indicated in the introduction, rather than further investigating how causal
inferences based on probability distributions can be disambiguated, the paper at
hand shall be concerned with the question whether similar ambiguities arise in case
of deterministic structures. To this end, the next section introduces the basics of a
Boolean procedure that uncovers such structures.
3 Uncovering Deterministic Structures
Even though there is little disagreement in the literature on the fact that many causal
structures, especially on a macro level, are ultimately deterministic, deterministic
data cannot be analyzed within the dominant (BN) framework, as such data features
more conditional independence relations than are implied by the Markov condition
and, thus, violates faithfulness.10 In order to illustrate this violation of faithfulness
consider structure (c) in Fig. 1 and, for simplicity, suppose that B is sufficient and
necessary for C. In that case, B and A are independent conditional on C, i.e.
pðAjB ^ CÞ ¼ pðAjCÞ, which is not implied by the causal Markov assumption. In a
deterministic structure every value of at least one exogenous variable uniquely
determines the values of at least one endogenous variable.11 Such deterministic
dependencies may, of course, not show up in corresponding data, if, for instance, not
all variables involved in the structure are contained in the set of investigated
variables or if not all relevant factors are controlled for in a pertaining study.
However, if deterministic structures are investigated against a causally homoge-
neous background—say, in a laboratory context—to the effect that deterministic
dependencies are actually exhibited in the data, the faithfulness assumption is
violated as illustrated above.
Deterministic causal structures are traditionally analyzed by methodologies
invoking Boolean techniques as e.g. Quine-McCluskey optimization of truth-
functions.12 The main modern developments in this tradition can be found in (Ragin
1987, 2000), (May 1999), and (Baumgartner 2008b). For lack of space, a Boolean
algorithm cannot be fully exhibited in the present context. This section is merely
going to present the essential conceptual core of Boolean causal reasoning. The
exemplary data used to illustrate the causal chain problem will then be kept as
simple as possible, such that the problem becomes transparent without in-depth
insights into the details of Boolean algorithms.
Boolean methodologies are designed to unfold deterministic structures on type
level, i.e. they analyze general causation. The relata of general causation can be seen
to be event types or factors for short. A factor that causes another factor is said to be
causally relevant to the latter. Factors are taken to be similarity sets of event tokens.
They are sets of type identical token events, of events that share at least one feature.
Whenever a member of a similarity set that corresponds to an event type occurs, the
latter is said to be instantiated. Factors are symbolized by italicized capital letters A,
10 Cf. e.g. (Spirtes et al. 2000), pp. 53-57, or (Glymour 2007).
11 For details Cf. (Glymour 2007), p. 236.
12 Cf. e.g. (Quine 1952) and (Quine 1959).
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B, etc. They are negatable. The negation of a factor A is written thus: A: A is simply
defined as the complementary set of A. Alternatively, factors can be seen as binary
variables that take the value 1 whenever an event of the corresponding type occurs
and the value 0 whenever no such event occurs. That means Boolean algorithms are
custom-built for deterministic structures featuring binary variables.13
Causal analyses are always relativized to a set of investigated factors. This set is
referred to as the factor frame of the analysis. Factors are virtually never causally
relevant to their effects in isolation. Rather, they are parts of whole causing
complexes—complex causes. A complex cause only becomes causally effective if all
of its constituents are co-instantiated, i.e. instantiated close-by or coincidently.
Moreover, causes do not determine their direct effects to occur anywhere and anytime,
but close-by. Determining a specific spatiotemporal interval such that, when factors
are instantiated within that interval, they can be said to be coincidently instantiated is
an intricate problem that, for lack of space, shall be sidestepped here.14 As is usually
done in studies on causal reasoning, I shall simply assume that for a given causal
process under investigation it is sufficiently clear what the coincidence relation
amounts to. Coincidently instantiated factors are termed coincidences. A coincidence
can be seen as a conjunction of coincidently instantiated factors A1 ^ A2 ^ . . . ^ An,
which for simplicity shall be abbreviated by a mere concatenation of corresponding
factors: A1A2…An. Coincidences constitute the empirical data processed by Boolean
procedures.15 Data collection, of course, has to comply with specific constraints that
guarantee the causal interpretability of that data. For instance, data must be collected
against a homogeneous background or data collection must be exhaustive. As we are
exclusively concerned with the causal interpretation of empirical data, the latter can
simply be assumed to be properly collected here.
Such as to illustrate the nature of the data processed by Boolean procedures, take
the factor frame F 1 consisting of the factors A, B, C, D, and E. Suppose, the
behavior of these five factors is regulated by some deterministic causal structure.
That there are deterministic dependencies among these factors means that they are
not co-instantiatable in all logically possible combinations. If, for instance, factor A
determines factor C, it is empirically impossible to realize the coincidence AC.
Thus, in order to infer a deterministic structure from empirical data, we need to
know what coincidences of the factors in our investigated frame are empirically
realizable. Boolean procedures, accordingly, infer causal structures from lists of e.g.
experimentally observed coincidences as listed in Table 1. The first row of that
exemplary coincidence list features the coincidence ABCDE, which means that the
five factors in F 1 have been observed to be instantiated coincidently. The second
row then reports an observation of ABCDE etc. In a nutshell, Boolean algorithms
assign causal structures to such coincidence lists by determining sufficiency and
13 The restriction to binary variables primarily serves conceptual simplicity. It allows for a
straightforward implementation of Boolean optimization procedures, which are of great relevance to
the uncovering of deterministic structures. Nonetheless, the restriction to binary variables implies that
structures involving multi-valued variables must be encoded in binary terms before they can be treated by
Boolean procedures.
14 For more details on the notion of coincidence cf. (Baumgartner 2008a), Appendix A.
15 Coincidences correspond to what (Ragin 1987) calls configurations.
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necessity relationships among the factors contained in the lists and by suitably
minimalizing these dependencies in order to eliminate redundancies.16
For example, relative to the data listed in Table 1 the coincidence ABCD is
sufficient for E, because this list contains one row such that ABCD is instantiated in
combination with E, viz. the first row, and no row such that ABCD is given and E is
not. ABCD, however, is not minimally sufficient for E, for ABCD contains proper
parts that are themselves sufficient for E. A conjunction of coincidently instantiated
factors A1A2…An, n B 1, is a minimally sufficient condition of a factor B iff
A1A2…An is sufficient for B, i.e. A1A2…An ?B, and there is no proper part a of
A1A2…An such that a?B. A proper part of a conjunction designates the result of
any reduction of this conjunction by one conjunct.17 If this notion of a minimally
sufficient condition is applied to Table 1, we find, for instance, that ABC—which is
a proper part of ABCD—is also sufficient for E, for Table 1 does not record a
coincidence such that ABC is given and E is not. ABC still contains sufficient proper
parts: All three of its conjuncts are themselves sufficient for E relative to Table 1. If
we let a Boolean discovery algorithm parse through Table 1 in this vein and identify
minimalized deterministic dependencies, we get the following overall result:18
A _ B $ C
A _ B _ C _ D $ E ðRÞ
In our exemplary coincidence list factor C is instantiated if and only if A or B are
instantiated, and E is instantiated if and only if A, B, C or D are instantiated. This
follows from the fact that there are no coincidences including
AC; BC; AE; BE; CE; DE; ABC and ABCDE in Table 1. That does not mean that,
say, A is sufficient for C in isolation. As mentioned above, causally interpretable
Table 1 Exemplary
coincidence list to be
analyzed by Boolean
methodologies
ABCDE
ABCDE
ABCDE
ABCDE
ABCDE
ABCDE
ABCDE
ABCDE
16 For further details cf. (Baumgartner 2008b) and (Baumgartner forthcoming).
17 Defining a minimally sufficient condition in terms of proper parts and not—as might be expected—in
terms of proper subsets that correspond to reductions of sufficient conditions by one or more conjuncts
allows for a simpler procedure to identify minimally sufficient conditions. For if a sufficient condition has
no sufficient proper parts, it does not have sufficient proper subsets either. Hence, in order to show that a
sufficient condition A1A2…An is minimally sufficient it suffices to establish that A1A2…An has no proper
parts—establishing that it has no sufficient proper subsets is unnecessary.
18 Of course, C and E are moreover each minimally sufficient for themselves. However, as self-causation
is normally excluded, these reflexive dependencies are not amenable to a causal interpretation to begin
with. Reflexive dependencies are therefore neglected in the context at hand.
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data must always be collected against a particular background. Correspondingly,
Table 1 merely determines A to be sufficient for C relative to that specific
configuration of unanalyzed background conditions.
A Boolean procedure first identifies a set of deterministic dependencies—ðRÞ in
our simple exemplary case—that hold among the factors in an analyzed coincidence
list and then, in a second step, causally interprets that set. Without going into the
details of causal interpretation rules, it can easily be seen that the data in Table 1
could have been generated by, at least, the two causal structures depicted in Fig. 2.19
Both the deterministic chain (d) and the common cause structure or epiphenom-
enon20 (e) give rise to exactly those dependencies among the factors in F 1 that are
reported in ðRÞ. Or put differently, according to both (d) and (e) precisely those
coincidences of A, B, C, D, and E are empirically realizable which are listed in
Table 1. If these two deterministic structures are investigated against a causally
homogeneous background, they generate the exact same coincidence data. I shall,
therefore, refer to (d) and (e) as c-equivalent causal structures. In sum, thus, Boolean
algorithms assign sets of c-equivalent causal structures to coincidence lists as
Table 1 along the lines sketched in this section. These sets sometimes contain one
single structure, and sometimes, as illustrated in the example discussed in this
section, multiple c-equivalent structures.21
A
C
B
E
D
E
DA
C
B
)e()d(
Fig. 2 A causal chain and an epiphenomenon that both could underly the behavior of the factors in F 1
and, accordingly, generate the data in Table 1. Note that the arrows in these graphs represent a specific
form of deterministic direct causal relevance: An edge as hA; Ci signifies that A is a sufficient direct cause
of C. This graphical notation is not to be confounded with arrows in graphical representations as can be
found in (Spirtes et al. 2000) or (Pearl 2000) where arrows stand for any functional dependence
19 Dependencies as recorded in ðRÞ are not as straightforwardly causally interpretable as might be
suggested here. Mackie’s (1974) famous Manchester Factory Hooters example demonstrates that
minimally sufficient conditions are not directly amenable to a causal interpretation. In Baumgartner
(2008b) I indicate what additional constraints have to be met in order to warrantably causally interpret
dependencies as in ðRÞ. For the context at hand, however, we can ignore these complications.
20 In the following, I interchangeably speak of common cause structures and epiphenomena. Note that
this terminology differs from the notion of an epiphenomenon used in the literature on mental causation.
In the latter context an epiphenomenon is a physically caused mental side effect which itself is causally
inert. Here ‘‘epiphenomenon’’ just describes a causal structure featuring at least one cause with at least
two parallel effects (cf. e.g. graphs (c), (c1) or (c2) of Fig. 1 or (e) of Fig. 2). Nothing with respect to a
causal impotence of these parallel effects is implied by referring to such a structure as being
epiphenomenal.
21 Cf. (Baumgartner 2008b).
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4 The Problem
Notwithstanding the fact that structures (d) and (e) regulate the behavior of the
factors in F 1 identically, they differ in causal respects. According to (d), A is
indirectly causally relevant for E, while it is attributed direct causal relevance for E
by (e). Moreover, C is causally relevant for E in (d), yet not in (e). These significant
differences in causal structuring, however, do not affect the behavior of the factors
in F 1 at all. Any coincidence of these factors is either compatible with both (d) and
(e) or with neither of the two structures. This shows that not only probabilistic data,
but also (noise-free) deterministic data is not always unambiguously causally
interpretable. Furthermore, this section is going to demonstrate that the c-
equivalence of (d) and (e) is not some idiosyncrasy of these particular structures
or of the data listed in Table 1. Rather, to every deterministic chain there exists an
epiphenomenon generating the same coincidence data as the chain. Every
deterministic chain is reducible to an epiphenomenon.
In order to see the general reducibility of chains to epiphenomena, it suffices to
realize that the characteristic structural feature of deterministic chains can also be
found in a specific kind of epiphenomena. Every deterministic chain comprises at
least two entangled factors: Two factors X1 and X2 are entangled iff all factors
contained in minimally sufficient conditions of X1 are part of minimally sufficient
conditions of X2 as well. A factor X is said to be part of a minimally sufficient
condition a if X is a conjunct contained in a. If X is the only conjunct in a minimally
sufficient condition, it is trivially part thereof. To parts of minimally sufficient
conditions I shall also refer as determinants in the following. While every
deterministic chain features at least two factors X1 and X2 such that all determinants
of X1 are determinants of X2 and, as a logical consequence thereof, X1 is a
determinant of X2, some common cause structures also comprise thus entangled
factors. To illustrate, consider our exemplary structures (d) and (e): Factors C and E
are not only entangled in (d) but also in (e). Whatever is minimally sufficient for C
is also minimally sufficient for E in both (d) and (e). Epiphenomena featuring at
least two entangled factors shall, accordingly, be referred to as entangled
epiphenomena. The chain (d) can be claimed to exhibit the dependencies expressed
in (1), while the epiphenomenon (e) specifies the dependencies in (2).
ðA _ B $ CÞ ^ ðC _ D $ EÞ ð1Þ
ðA _ B $ CÞ ^ ðA _ B _ D $ EÞ ð2Þ
(1) and (2) are logically equivalent, which can easily be established by alternately
substituting C and A_B in the second conjuncts of the two expressions. This
substitutability is guaranteed by the first conjuncts of (1) and (2). The two
expressions are moreover logically equivalent to a conjunction of the dependencies
mentioned in ðRÞ. To every expression of type (1) there exists a logically equivalent
expression of type (2), and, accordingly, to every deterministic chain there exists a
c-equivalent entangled epiphenomenon.22
22 Further exemplary reductions of chains to epiphenomena can be found in Figs. 4–6 below.
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While entanglements are the characteristic of chains, there are epiphenomena
without entangled factors, such as structure (c1) in Fig. 1. Epiphenomena without
entanglements are not c-equivalent to any chain. According to (c1), the parallel
effects A and C of the common cause B can be instantiated in all logically possible
combinations, whereas in virtue of the corresponding chain (a1) C is instantiated
whenever there is an instance of A. That is, while all chains contain at least two
entangled factors, epiphenomena may, but must not feature entanglements.
‘Ordinary’ deterministic epiphenomena without entanglements are unambiguously
identifiable via the coincidence lists they generate.
However, based on deterministic coincidence data an unambiguous inference to
causal chains is excluded in principle. Coincidence data which can be modeled in
terms of a chain can equally be modeled in terms of an entangled epiphenomenon.
To this indistinguishability of deterministic chains and entangled epiphenomena I
shall in the following refer as the causal chain problem.
Causal chain problem: Whenever causal structures are investigated on such a
fine-grained level that deterministic dependencies are exhibited in pertinent
coincidence data L and L is compatible with a causal chain S1, there exists an
entangled epiphenomenon S2 such that L is compatible with S2 as well.
Deterministic (noise-free) coincidence data cannot unambiguously be identified
to be the result of a chain.
Note that the chain problem is characteristic for deterministic data, i.e. data that
does not exhibit all 2n logically possible configurations of n factors in a causally
analyzed frame. If the causal structure behind our exemplary coincidence list in
Table 1 were not investigated against a noise-free background to the effect that our
data would consist of a frequency distribution listing frequencies for all 32 logically
possible combinations of the five factors A, B, C, D, E and if that frequency
distribution, moreover, were to satisfy the Markov and faithfulness assumptions, BN-
algorithms would be able to distinguish between structures (d) and (e). As (d) and (e)
do not have identical unshielded colliders they are not Markov equivalent. This
finding, of course, raises the somewhat counterintuitive question whether determin-
istic structures should deliberately not be investigated on such a fine-grained level
that deterministic dependencies are manifested, i.e. whether a certain amount of
confounding noise is a desirable feature of causally analyzed empirical data after all.
For, while noise-free deterministic data in principle does not allow for unambiguous
inferences to chains, unambiguous inferences to chains are not excluded relative to a
noisy background that generates a causally Markov and faithful frequency
distribution. An answer to this question has to await another paper.
The rest of this paper shall be dedicated to the question how ambiguities affecting
the causal interpretation of deterministic data can possibly be reduced or even
completely eliminated. For, clearly, the chain problem heavily conflicts with common
intuitions according to which deterministic chains are omnipresent in nature, at least
on a macro level. Hence, what are the grounds based on which we ever so often model
deterministic data in terms of chains rather than common cause structures? This
question becomes even more pressing if we no longer treat the factors in our exemplary
frameF 1 as abstract variables, but interpret them in terms of concrete event types. For
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as soon as such interpretations are provided, causal intuitions are as firm as can be
when it comes to opting for the chain or the epiphenomenon given a coincidence list as
in Table 1. Consider the following interpretations:
Interpretation (I): Assume a car engine can be started in two ways only: either by
turning the key in the starter lock or by short-circuiting the ignition cable.
Whenever the engine is running, the corresponding car begins to move. The car
can be set in motion by alternative factors also, such as towing or pushing, i.e. by
external impulses:
A = Turning the key in the starter lock
B = Short-circuiting the ignition cable
C = Running engine
D = External impulse
E = Motion of the wheels.
Interpretation (I) clearly suggests the underlying causal structure to be (d) in Fig. 2.
Hence, provided that the factors in Table 1 are interpreted according to (I), we tend
to model the underlying process in terms of a chain.
Interpretation (II): Suppose in a particular city there are exactly two power stations.
The power supply of a specific house, say house a, in that city entirely depends on
the power production in at least one of the two stations. Another house, call it b, is
equipped with a generator for cases of citywide power failures. Whenever one of the
two power stations produces electricity, both a and b are power supplied:
A = Power production by station 1
B = Power production by station 2
C = Power supply of house a
D = Power production by the generator in b
E = Power supply of house b.
If the coincidences in Table 1 are interpreted in the vein of (II), the behavior of the
factors in F 1 is intuitively seen to be regulated by a common cause structure of type
(e).
Intuitively there is no doubt that the causal process starting with turning the key
in the starter lock and resulting in the motion of the wheels has the form of a chain
and that there is a common cause structure behind the power supply of houses a and
b. Still, the coincidences in Table 1 alone neither warrant the first nor the second of
these inferences. Therefore, our firm intuitions as regards causal modeling relative
to a respective interpretation cannot exclusively be based on the deterministic data
contained in Table 1.
5 Disambiguation Candidates
Prima facie, a plausible reaction to the chain problem as presented thus far will be to
claim that this problem merely demonstrates the impossibility to positively identify
The Causal Chain Problem 211
123
deterministic chains based on coincidence information alone. The chain problem
might be seen to establish that coincidence data must be complemented by
additional empirical information in order to allow for unambiguous inferences to
chainlike structures. When we pre-theoretically or informally model the processes
behind interpretations (I) and (II) we seem to implicitly draw on additional
information, which apparently resolves c-equivalencies. There are several conceiv-
able sources of additional information based on which solutions of the chain
problem might be developed.23 Let us consider them in turn.
5.1 Chronological Order
One suggestion to solve the chain problem by consulting additional sources of
empirical information could be to impose a chronological ordering onto the
instances of the factors in a causal structure. If it is stipulated that causes always
occur before their effects, a chain structure as graph (d) in Fig. 2 could be claimed
to determine instances of C to occur prior to the instances of E. This, in turn, does
not hold for the epiphenomenal structure depicted in graph (e). An entangled
epiphenomenon as (e) is compatible with instances of C and E occurring
simultaneously. Such as to illustrate this difference, graphs (d) and (e) are
confronted with a timeline in Fig. 3.
As is well known, it is highly dubitable whether causes in fact can justifiably be
claimed to always occur before their effects and, thus, whether a simultaneity of
causes and effects can be excluded on a priori conceptual grounds.24 Nevertheless,
such as to see whether the ambiguities induced by the chain problem could, in
principle, be solved along these lines, let us abstain from these difficulties in the
present context and assume that causes generally occur prior to their effects. Subject
to that assumption, factors involved in a coincidence list as the one in Table 1,
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t3 E
D
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(d) (e) (e1)
Fig. 3 The arrow on the left hand side represents the direction of time such that t1 \ t2 \ t3. While (e)
determines instances of C and E to occur simultaneously, (d) and (e1) represent causal structures
according to which C is instantiated before E
23 Most of the suggestions as to how to disambiguate inferences to complex causal structures considered
in the following have also been discussed in the context of resolving probabilistic ambiguities (Cf. e.g.
(Suppes 1970), (Spirtes et al. 2000), (Hausman 1998), or (Woodward 2003)).
24 Cf. e.g. (Lewis 1979), (Brand 1980) or (Huemer and Kovitz 2003).
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which could stem both from a chain and an entangled epiphenomenon, have to be
compared as to the chronological ordering of their instances. Finding C and E to be
simultaneously instantiated then prompts an inference to the epiphenomenal model.
So far so good. Yet, what if instances of C and E are not found to occur
simultaneously? Can the structure behind Table 1 unambiguously be modeled in
terms of a chain, if it is found that events of type C occur prior to events of type E?
As structure (e1) in Fig. 3 shows, that is not the case. Epiphenomenal structures are
compatible with simultaneous occurrences of their parallel effects, but they do not
determine such simultaneity. Effects of a common cause might well be instantiated
sequentially. Suppose, houses a and b in the power station example are connected to
the power stations by wiring of different length or of different conductivity, such
that electricity always reaches house a prior to house b. Nonetheless, of course, the
causal structure behind this chronological specification of the power station example
is to be modeled in terms of an epiphenomenon. Hence, while (e) might be
identifiable by means of chronological constraints, (d) and (e1) cannot thus be kept
apart, for they are not only c-equivalent, but also chronologically equivalent. Every
coincidence list that could be the result of a chain might just as well be the product
of a chronologically ordered entangled epiphenomenon of type (e1). Building the
direction of time into a criterion that distinguishes between chains and entangled
epiphenomena would merely allow for identifying those entangled epiphenomena
that happen to be constituted by simultaneously occurring parallel effects. Such a
criterion would, however, be of no help when it comes to identifying deterministic
chains.
5.2 Spatiotemporal Proximity
The direction of time is not the only further empirical information that could be
resorted to as a means to distinguish between chains and entangled epiphenomena.
Spatiotemporal proximity might be proposed as an alternative. If it is stipulated that
instances of causes occur proximately to the instances of their direct effects, a chain
structure as graph (d) can be claimed to determine instances of C to occur
proximately to the instances of E. This does not hold for the epiphenomenal
structure (e). On the contrary, in an epiphenomenon there is no necessary
spatiotemporal connection between instances of parallel effects of a common cause.
As mentioned in Sect. 3, causes determine their direct effects to occur within a
certain spatiotemporal interval or within the same situation. Yet, it is far from clear
what exactly this spatiotemporal relation is. Depending on the causal process under
investigation and the level of specification chosen for a causal analysis, instances of
causes and their direct effects can be said to be properly related only if they are in
plain spatiotemporal contact, while in other cases causes may well be instantiated
some nonzero distance away from their direct effects. The allowable distance
between causes and effects cannot be fixed to a specific spatiotemporal interval. The
theory of Special Relativity only provides an upper bound: Causes and effects must
be instantiated within each other’s light cones. Notwithstanding this lacking
specificity, given a concrete causal process and a level of specificity chosen for the
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analysis of that process it is normally uncontroversial which factors can be said to be
proximately instantiated. In order to see whether the chain problem could, at least in
principle, be solved by somehow drawing on the spatiotemporal association of the
instances of causes and effects, let us, thus, in the present context ignore the
notorious fuzziness involved in the notion of spatiotemporal proximity of the causal
relata.
Assume we have identified a nonzero interval s that constitutes a suitable
interpretation of proximity for the factors in our exemplary frame F 1. Such as to
determine whether the structure underlying the behavior of the factors in F 1 is a
chain or an epiphenomenon by drawing on s it must be checked whether (i) C
and E are instantiated within s, whereas A_B and E are not, or whether (ii) A_B
and E are instantiated within s, whereas C and E are not. Let us suppose that the
scenario given in interpretation (I) is a case of type (i) and that the scenario
described by interpretation (II) is of type (ii). That is, we assume that the turning
of the starter key is proximate to the firing spark plug and the running engine, yet
not proximate to the turning wheels, which, instead, are proximate to the running
engine. Furthermore, the two power stations shall be taken to be proximate to the
power supplied houses, which themselves are not proximate to each other.
Relative to such a constellation the chain and the epiphenomenal model could in
fact be discerned by drawing on the spatiotemporal relation among the instances
of the involved factors.
Spatiotemporal proximity, however, only paves the way towards a solution of the
chain problem if we were in fact ready to model the structures behind examples (I)
and (II) differently given that spatiotemporal relations changed. Hence, let us
assume that some outlandish engineer designed a car whose starter lock is located
on the hubcap of the right rear wheel, to the effect that the turning of this car’s
starter key does not happen within s of the running engine, but, rather, within s of
the rolling wheels. Yet apart from this peculiarity, this unusual car resembles
ordinary cars in all detail. Or more abstractly put: Suppose this car constitutes an
instance of a constellation as described in (ii). Is the turning of the starter key now
directly causally relevant to the motion of the wheels? Would we be ready to model
the causal structure behind this car’s movement in terms of an entangled
epiphenomenon? Certainly not. The situation is completely analogous in case of
entangled epiphenomena. Supposing that houses a and b of the power supply
example are neighboring or, more generally, instantiated in terms of (i) does not
change the causal structuring of the underlying process at all. Given that the two
houses are proximate does not turn the epiphenomenon into a chain.
If the distinction between chains and entangled epiphenomena really hinges on
some form of spatiotemporal proximity, it must be a very special kind of proximity
that accounts for it. It must be a form of proximity such that ‘causal influence’ is
transmitted from an instance of a cause to its proximate successor. In case of the car
with the starter lock on its hubcap, for instance, such transfer of ‘causal influence’
can be claimed to proceed through the wiring and by mediation of the engine and
not directly from the lock to the wheels. Yet, a notion of spatiotemporal proximity
that involves transmission of ‘causal influence’, obviously, is of no use when it
comes to inferring causal structures from empirical data without prior causal
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knowledge about the processes underlying the data. For whether ‘causal influence’
is transmitted from C to E in our exemplary frame is just what is under
investigation.
5.3 Transference
Nonetheless, this finding might be taken to indicate that the chain problem could be
solved in the vein of the so-called transference theory of causation.25 The following
criterion to distinguish between the chain and the epiphenomenal model with
respect to the frame F 1 might be proposed: If it is found that energy or momentum
or, more generally, some conserved quantity is transferred from instances of C to
instances of E, the behavior of the factors in F 1 is regulated by a causal chain—
otherwise by an entangled epiphenomenon.
Prima facie, this criterion in fact seems to perfectly capture our pre-theoretic
reasons to model scenario (I) in terms of a chain and (II) in terms of an
epiphenomenon. There is a transfer of energy from the operating engine to the
rolling wheels, which, therefore, is a chain. In contrast, no energy is transferred
from house a to house b, which induces an epiphenomenal modeling. This
modeling of (I) and (II) is unaffected by any of the modifications of the examples
discussed in the previous section. Hence, even the causal structuring of the car
whose starter lock is located on a hubcap is identified to be a chain, because energy
is transferred from the turning of the lock to the spark plug and from the operating
engine to the wheels.
As in case of the disambiguation candidates discussed above, there are principled
objections against drawing on transfer processes in causal reasoning. First, it has
been pointed out that by far not all causal processes—notably in the field of social
sciences—in fact involve energy transfer, and second, it has been argued that the
identification of transfer processes presupposes a considerable amount of prior
causal knowledge about investigated structures.26 At the core of transference
theories lies the distinction between genuine causal processes and so-called pseudo-
processes: While a genuine causal process features energy transmission, a pseudo-
process does not. Yet, in order to make sense of the notion of energy transmission,
clarity on what a causal process is needs to be provided. Identifying the factors in an
investigated structure whose instances are connected by energy transfers is not
independent of identifying the factors that are causally dependent. Nonetheless,
clarity on causal dependencies is just what the transference theoretic framework
intends to supply.27 However, for the sake of the argument, let us again ignore these
conceptual hurdles in order to see whether, given that clarity on the notion of a
transfer process could somehow be presupposed, the chain problem could at least be
solved for physical processes that in fact involve such transferences.
25 For a modern variant of this account see e.g. (Dowe 2000).
26 For a condensed presentation of the pros and cons of a transference theory of causation cf. (Dowe
2007). For more details cf. (Dowe 2000) or (Kistler 2001).
27 Cf. (Salmon 1994).
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Determining whether the structure behind the coincidences in Table 1 is a chain
or an epiphenomenon, according to a transfer criterion, amounts to checking if there
is energy or some other conserved quantity being transferred from the instances of C
to the instances of E. That, in turn, requires that some kind of measurement device is
installed on the path from C to E. If this device detects a transfer process, the
structure generating the data in Table 1 is a chain, otherwise it turns out to be an
epiphenomenon. Installing such a device induces an expansion of the causal model
depicted in graph (d). In graph (d1) of Fig. 4 this expansion is illustrated by the
introduction of factors X1 and X2, where X1 represents some conserved quantity
being transferred and X2 stands for needle deflection in a corresponding
measurement device.28 Clearly, (d1) is not c-equivalent to the entangled epiphe-
nomenon (e) of Fig. 2. Causal structures comprising different factors, trivially, do
not generate identical coincidence data. Yet, as (d1) is a causal chain as well, there
again exists a c-equivalent epiphenomenon, viz. (e2). Thus, while a transfer criterion
may distinguish between (d1) and (e), it does not distinguish between (d1) and (e2).
That means claiming that the needle deflection in a measuring device is triggered by
C and an ensuing transfer process, on the one hand, or by A or B, on the other,
empirically amounts to the same. Now, of course further measurement devices
might be installed on the edges hC; X1i and hX1; Ei in (d1). However, for all such
expansions of (d1) there will exist c-equivalent epiphenomena.
These new equivalencies might be taken to show that, even if energy transfer
from C to E is not measurable in a way that allows for a positive identification of a
chain, it should at least be possible to test whether such a transfer process—if there
is one going on—can be intercepted. For instance, without a crankshaft, which
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(d)
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E
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X2
(d1) (e2)
X1 X2
Fig. 4 Structure (d1) is the result of introducing two additional factors into (d): X1 represents a transfer
process between C and E and X2 stands for needle deflection in a measuring device. To (d1) there again
exists an c-equivalent epiphenomenon: (e2)
28 In the social science literature there is a related methodology called process-tracing that aims to
establish the existence of a causal mechanism between two investigated variables Y1 and Y2 by
successively filling in intermediate variables on the path hY1; Y2i (Cf. e.g. (Mahoney 2000) or (George
and Bennett 2005), ch. 10). Some authors interested in social mechanisms argue that such mechanisms are
unobservable primitive entities (Cf. e.g. (Steinmetz 1998)). As such they could not be treated on a par
with ordinary causal variables as done in the graphs of Fig. 4. However, unobservable mechanisms,
apparently, are of no avail when it comes to distinguishing between structures (d) and (e) on empirical
grounds.
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translates the reciprocating linear piston motion into rotation, the kinetic energy of
the car engine is not transferred to the axis. If the crankshaft is broken, the wheels
do not turn even if the engine is running. Does this finding conclusively establish the
structure behind interpretation (I) to be chainlike? Intercepting the transference of
kinetic energy from the engine to the axis by manipulating the crankshaft amounts
to nothing else but showing that the wheels of the car only start turning if the engine
is running and the crankshaft is working properly or there is some external impulse.
Thus, C is revealed not to be sufficient for E in isolation. C determines E only in
combination with a functioning crankshaft X3: CX3 _ D $ E. Hence, the structure
(d) must be expanded by X3 such that C and X3 constitute a complex cause of E.
This is graphically captured by an arch connecting the edges hC; Ei and hX3; Ei in
graph (d2) of Fig. 5.
29 Again, (d2) and (e) clearly are not c-equivalent. However, as
(d2) is a chain structure as well, there exists another c-equivalent entangled
epiphenomenon: (e3). Whether CX3 is said to be a deterministic complex cause of E
or whether AX3 and BX3 are identified as E’s complex causes empirically amounts to
the same.
That is, even though it is possible to distinguish between two particular causal
structures such as (d1) and (e) or (d2) and (e) by drawing on the notion of a transfer
process, to every expanded chain as (d1) and (d2) there still exist c-equivalent
epiphenomena. Thus, the chain problem is not solved by resorting to the notion of a
transfer process. Rather than solving the chain problem a transfer criterion, at best,
calls for further and further expansions of investigated factor frames and
corresponding causal models without ever positively identifying a deterministic
chain.
5.4 Interventions—Prior Causal Knowledge
As indicated in Sect. 2, according to a popular proposal in the literature on
probabilistic indistinguishability, Markov equivalent structures can be discerned by
suitably manipulating them. Very roughly put, e.g. (Spirtes et al. 2000), ch. 7, argue
that in order to distinguish between structures (a) and (c) of Fig. 1 it needs to be
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Fig. 5 (d2) is the result of introducing one additional factor into (d): X3 represents a co-factor together
with which C constitutes a complex cause of E—the arch symbolizing conjunction. However, to (d2)
there again exists a c-equivalent epiphenomenon: (e3)
29 For details on this graphical notation cf. (Baumgartner 2006), ch. 2.
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tested whether A and C can be manipulated independently of each other.30 If that is
the case, the structure regulating the behavior of these factors is an epiphenomenon,
otherwise it is a chain. In (Woodward 2003) this idea is embedded into a full-
fledged interventionist theory of causation. (Richardson et al. 2007) indicate that
such an interventionist methodology can also be usefully implemented when it
comes to uncovering deterministic structures. Let us therefore see whether c-
equivalent structures as (d) and (e) can be kept apart by suitably drawing on
interventions.
Interventionist inference procedures rest on a very specific notion of an
intervention variable which (Woodward 2003), p. 98, defines along the following
lines: I is an intervention variable for a variable X with respect to a variable Y iff (i) I
causes X, (ii) certain values of I render X independent of all its other causes, (iii) any
directed path from I to Y goes through X, and (iv) I is (statistically) independent of
any variable Z that causes Y and that is located on a directed path that does not go
through X. In case of deterministic structures, an intervention variable for X with
respect to Y can simply be understood as an exogenous factor I that is sufficient and
directly causally relevant for X and any directed path from I to Y goes through X. For
instance, I is an intervention variable for C with respect to E in structures (d3) and
(e4) of Fig. 6. The variable I in structure (e5), however, violates condition (iii) as it
is not only directly relevant to C but also to E. Relative to the notion of an
intervention variable an (actual) intervention can then straightforwardly be spelled
out in terms of an intervention variable I for X with respect to Y taking on some
value zi such that zi causes X to take on some determinate value zj.
Drawing on that notion of an intervention in order to distinguish between
structures (d) and (e) amounts to the following: If, against the causal background of
Table 1, there is at least one way to intervene on C that is systematically
accompanied by a change in E—for brevity, call this scenario T 1—, the underlying
structure is a chain, otherwise—scenario T 2—it is an epiphenomenon.31 Let us
examine the merits of this proposal. If every manipulation of C by means of a
variable I leaves E unaltered, i.e. in case of T 2, the structure regulating the factors in
our exemplary frame indeed cannot be a chain. The only structure that can
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Fig. 6 In structures (d3) and (e4) I amounts to an intervention variable for C with respect to E, whereas in
(e5) it does not
30 Similarly Pearl (2000).
31 Cf. (Woodward 2003), p. 101.
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accommodate an expansion of the original factor frame yielding scenario T 2 is
structure (e4). This shows that ordinary non-entangled epiphenomena can be
positively identified on empirical grounds within an interventionist framework.
Does this framework also allow for a positive identification of chains? Assume that
suitably manipulating C by means of a factor I is accompanied by a corresponding
change in E, thus, assume that T 1 obtains. On the face of it, there are two structures
that could account for T 1, viz. (d3) and (e5). However, only in structure (d3) I
actually satisfies the constraints imposed on intervention variables above. In (e5) I
violates condition (iii) because it is not only directly relevant to C but also to E. That
is, if I is assumed to be an intervention variable for C with respect to E, only the
chain model can accommodate a continuing dependency of C and E under
manipulations of C by means of I. Provided that I is an intervention variable, the
inference to chains and entangled epiphenomena, respectively, can in fact be
disambiguated within the interventionist framework.
A positive identification of deterministic chains along these lines, of course,
crucially rests on the assumption that I indeed is an intervention variable. How can
such an assumption be justified, i.e. how is I revealed to be an intervention variable
for C with respect to E given that manipulating C by means of I is accompanied by
corresponding changes in E? Here a problem emerges: Demonstrating that I
represents an intervention on C with respect to E relative to scenario T 1 is not
independent of determining whether the causal structure responsible for the
occurrence of T 1 is adequately modeled in terms of (d3) or of (e5). For in order to
substantiate that I is an intervention variable for C with respect to E it must be
shown that there is no direct causal connection between I and E. That means it must
be shown that the structure generating scenario T 1 is not an entangled
epiphenomenon of type (e5)—which then, of course, leaves (d3) as only remaining
model candidate. Whether that indeed is the case or not, however, is just the
question raised by the chain problem. In order to establish that I is an intervention
on C with respect to E, it must be presupposed that T 1 is not adequately accounted
for in terms of (e5). Plainly, if the assumption that I represents an intervention on C
with respect to E is then used to determine whether the structure regulating the
behavior of the factors in the extended frame {A, B, C, D, E, I} is of form (e5) or
not, the question raised by the chain problem is begged. In sum, a disambiguation of
the inference to deterministic chains along the interventionist lines is a disambig-
uation by means of a causal assumption that, in case of scenario T 1, simply
excludes modeling pertinent data in terms of an entangled epiphenomenon.32
It is beyond doubt, however, that ever so often in experimental practice prior
causal knowledge is available that determines factors or variables to satisfy the
constraints imposed on interventions above and that excludes entangled epiphe-
nomena as possible models, respectively. In case of scenario T 1, such prior
knowledge conclusively establishes that the behavior of the factors in our exemplary
frame is governed by a deterministic chain. Clearly though, along these
32 This is just one consequence of the fact that the notions of causation and intervention are directly
interdefined in the interventionist framework of (Woodward 2003). For further consequences of this
conceptual interdependence Cf. (Baumgartner unpublished).
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interventionist lines the inference to chains is disambiguated on causal and not on
empirical grounds. Whenever no prior causal knowledge that excludes epiphenom-
enal models is available, causal chains cannot be positively identified by means of
interventions. Furthermore, whenever the inference to chains is disambiguated by
invoking prior causal knowledge, the question arises as to what warrants that
knowledge. What empirical evidence ultimately justifies assuming I to be an
intervention variable for C with respect to E in case of T 1; or, equivalently, what
empirical evidence ultimately justifies the assumption that scenario T 1 is not to be
accounted for in terms of an entangled epiphenomenon? The considerations of this
section render it doubtful that, in the end, there exists an empirical vindication of
such assumptions.
To sum up: All the different proposals to disambiguate the inference to
deterministic chains discussed in this section embark on the same core strategy.
They all aim to resolve ambiguities by broadening the empirical basis based on
which the structure behind the data in Table 1 is to be identified. On the one hand,
we have found that even though additional information about temporal orderings or
spatiotemporal relations among events instantiating the factors in Table 1 may
distinguish between two particular causal models as e.g. (d) and (e) in Fig. 3, such
additional information nonetheless does not ground conclusive identifications of
deterministic chains. On the other hand, resolving ambiguities by drawing on
transfer processes or interventions essentially amounts to expanding the factor
frame of Table 1 and collecting additional coincidence information about the
factors contained in those extended frames. Such a collection of further coincidence
data, trivially, either breaks the entanglement of C and E or it does not. The fact that
C and E remain entangled relative to additional data is more precisely expressed in
(CE):
(CE) For all coincidence lists Lx that result from expanding the factor frame
{A, B, C, D, E} of Table 1 by factors X1,…, Xn and from collecting coincidence
data over the frame {A, B, C, D, E, X1,…, Xn}: C and E are entangled in Lx.
As long as collecting further coincidence data does not violate (CE), there exist at
least two c-equivalent models accounting for that data equally well. Collecting more
coincidence information does not by itself, i.e. without accompanying causal
assumptions that exclude the rivaling epiphenomenal model, allow for an
unambiguous inference to the deterministic chain. In whatever way further
empirical information that complies to (CE) is brought to bear, there will always
exist a common cause model that accounts for the data equally well as the chain
model. The fact that interventionist methodologies perform best when it comes to
unambiguously assigning a causal structure to Table 1 suggests that the inference to
deterministic chains inevitably presupposes prior causal knowledge about the
structure under investigation.33 The chain problem, in turn, indicates that in case of
deterministic chains such knowledge is likely not to be justifiable on purely
empirical grounds and, accordingly, must ultimately be grounded in (non-empirical)
causal assumptions. The next section is going to reveal an important asymmetry
33 Cf. Cartwright’s famous dictum ‘‘no causes in, no causes out’’, (Cartwright 1983).
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between modeling data in terms of deterministic chains and entangled epiphenom-
ena—an asymmetry which might be resorted to in order to justify such causal
assumptions.
6 An Asymmetry Between Chains and Entangled Epiphenomena
While factor frame expansions and collecting further coincidence information about
extended frames do not ground empirical distinctions between deterministic chains
and entangled epiphenomena, this section is going to show that such expansions still
bring about an important asymmetry between modeling data as given in Table 1 in
terms of a chain and an entangled epiphenomenon, respectively. In both our
exemplary interpretations (I) and (II) of that data an utterly simplistic causal
structure is assumed to regulate the behavior of the factors in F 1. Real cars can be
started in manifold ways, each of which involve many more factors than merely the
turning of a starter key or the short-circuiting of a cable. The same holds for power
supplied houses. The mere operating of power stations is commonly neither
sufficient nor necessary for the power supply in houses. It takes a sophisticated
infrastructure to bring the electricity to the consumers and generators or batteries
can supply any houses, not just b, with power. F 1 is extendable in manifold ways
when it comes to generating a more realistic scenario with respect to our examples.
Against the background of interpretation (I), F 1 is extendable by, say, the factors:
G = Starting the engine by use of jumper cables
H = Starting the engine by use of a mechanical starting device
I = Transmission of an electrical impulse to the spark plug.
The thus extended factor frame shall be labeled F 2. In contrast to interpretation (I),
F 1, when interpreted according to (II), is e.g. extendable by the following factor:
L = Power production by the generator in a.
This expansion of F 1, interpreted in terms of (II), will be referred to as F 3:
The expansions of F 1 to F 2 and F 3 differ in an important respect: The expansion
of F 1 to F 2 is structure-conserving, whereas the same does not hold for the
expansion of F 1 to F 3. The feature of the graphs (d) and (e) which is characteristic
for the chain problem is the entanglement of C and E. This entanglement is
conserved when F 1—interpreted along the lines of (I)—is expanded to F 2. It is not
only conserved upon expanding F 1 by G, H, and I. Every factor that is newly
introduced into a deterministic chain as (d) and that is part of a minimally sufficient
condition of C, is part of a minimally sufficient condition of E as well. Whatever
determinant of C is introduced into structure (d) above the C vertex, it is a
determinant of E as well. This follows from the mere structure of causal chains. In
contrast to the structure-conserving expansion F 2 of F 1, expanding F 1—
interpreted along the lines of (II)—to F 3 suspends the entanglement of C and E.
For relative to such an expansion there will be cases in which house a is power
supplied while house b is not, for instance, when neither of the two power stations
operate, the generator in b is out of order, yet house a is supplied with electricity by
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its own generator L. Accordingly, L is a determinant of C but not of E. In case of
interpretation (II), hence, expanding F 1 supplements our data in Table 1 by
additional coincidences to the effect that the entanglement of C and E is suspended.
This yields a coincidence list that is unambiguously assignable to an (ordinary)
epiphenomenon.
This difference with respect to expansions of chains and common cause
structures can be nicely illustrated by graphical means. Graph (d*) of Fig. 7
represents a possible expansion of (d) which demonstrates that every determinant of
C which is newly introduced into (d) must be a determinant of E as well. Take, for
instance, X6 in (d*). X6 is part of a minimally sufficient condition of C, viz. X1X6.
Accordingly, X6 is moreover part of a minimally sufficient condition of E, viz.
X1X4X6. Contrary to the chain, a common cause structure does not necessitate newly
introduced determinants of C to be determinants of E as well. X1 in (e*) is a
determinant of C but not one of E.
Of course, there again is an entangled epiphenomenon that is c-equivalent to
(d*). Nonetheless, chains and entangled epiphenomena differ with respect to
expansions of their factor frames. While chains necessarily conserve entanglements
across all factor frame extensions, entangled epiphenomena do not necessitate the
persistence of entanglements. The retention of entanglements across arbitrary factor
frame or model extensions is a characteristic feature of deterministic chains. In
every deterministic chain there are at least two entangled factors whose
entanglement subsists across all extensions. That is, such entanglements are
necessary conditions for a respective coincidence list to be the result of a causal
chain. The same does not hold for epiphenomena. Even though certain factors may
be entangled in epiphenomenal structures—as graph (e) demonstrates—, these
structures do not necessitate such entanglements to be permanent.
Therefore, even though modeling a coincidence list as the one in Table 1 in terms
of a chain or an epiphenomenon is equally warranted by Table 1, it makes a
difference whether somebody causally analyzing that data takes it to be generated
by a chain or by an epiphenomenon. In order to clearly bring out that difference let
(d*) (e*)
E
X4 X5
X3
X1 X2 X2
X3 X4 X5 X6
X1
X7
A
C
B D
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X6 X7 X8 X9 X10
A B
C D
Fig. 7 Two possible expansions of graphs (d) and (e) in Fig. 2. Every determinant of C introduced into
(d) above the C vertex, necessarily, is a determinant of E. The same does not hold for (e)
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us picture two different experimenters investigating the structure behind Table 1—
Fennella and Shamus. Assume that Fennella assigns chain (d) to Table 1 and
Shamus models that data in terms of epiphenomenon (e). Both Fennella and Shamus
equally account for Table 1. Fennella, however, not only provides a causal model
that adequately accounts for that data, but moreover assesses that no factor newly
introduced into her model in the course of further analysis of the structure behind
Table 1 will resolve the entanglement of C and E. Put differently, Fennella does not
only claim the causal dependencies to subsist that are stated in (d), but thereby also
claims (CE). Accounting for the data in Table 1 in terms of (d) implies (CE). In
contrast, by assigning the entangled epiphenomenon (e) to Table 1 Shamus merely
states the dependencies expressed in (e). He remains completely non-committal
with respect to (CE). (e) does not imply (CE). Hence, taking a coincidence list as the
one in Table 1 to be generated by a chain is a stronger claim than modeling the
causal structure behind Table 1 in terms of an epiphenomenon.
Now, let us assume that Fennella and Shamus embark on further analysis of the
causal structure behind Table 1. That is, they extend the factor frame F 1 and collect
new coincidence data on the factors in the extended frame. Continuously
broadening the empirical basis of their study in this vein, trivially, brings about
either of two scenarios: The entanglement of C and E is not suspended—scenario
T 1—or the entanglement of C and E is suspended—scenario T 2. If the latter
scenario obtains, i.e. if an extension of F 1 leads to the discovery of a determinant of
C which is not at the same time a determinant of E, the structure behind the behavior
of the factors in F 1 is proven to be epiphenomenal. Accordingly, Shamus’s model is
proven to be correct, whereas Fennella’s is falsified. Suppose, however, further
investigation into the causal structure behind F 1 does not reveal a previously
unknown factor that suspends the entanglement of C and E, i.e. suppose T 1 obtains.
Both Fennella and Shamus can extend their models such that they account for
scenario T 1. A continuing entanglement of C and E can be modeled either in terms
of a chain or of a common cause structure. However, Fennella predicted that T 1
would occur from the beginning, whereas Shamus did not commit himself to either
T 1 or T 2. Thus, finding that T 1 in fact obtains does not surprise Fennella at all.
Fennella’s claim (CE) receives empirical support by T 1. Of course, the mere fact
that (CE), which is a logical consequence of Fennella’s chain model, is empirically
confirmed by T 1 does not prove the chain model to be correct. Scenario T 1 lends
equal empirical support to the chain as to the common cause model. Nonetheless,
Fennella can straightforwardly account for why T 1 rather than T 2 has occurred. In
contrast, even though Shamus can suitably extend his original model (e) such that
every newly introduced determinant of C is also a determinant of E, his common
cause model by itself does not account for why T 1 rather than T 2 has occurred.
Maybe Shamus can provide a different reason as to why the extension of the original
frame F 1 did not lead to the discovery of a determinant of C that is not a
determinant of E as well—maybe prior causal knowledge about the process under
investigation is available that accounts for why T 1 rather than T 2 has occurred.
Without such an independent account for the subsistence of the entanglement of C
and E, however, finding that this entanglement has not been broken by further data
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must be somewhat surprising to Shamus. The epiphenomenal model (e) does not
provide any reason to expect T 1 rather than T 2 to occur.
That means a chain and an associated entangled epiphenomenon have different
implications for expansions of the empirical basis of a causal analysis. This
asymmetry might be fruitfully exploited when it comes to choosing between the two
models. The previous section has cast doubt on there existing purely empirical
reasons that unambiguously call for modeling deterministic data that features at
least two entangled factors in terms of a chain. The methodology of causal
reasoning that fares best when it comes to inferring deterministic chains arguably is
one embedded in an interventionist framework as e.g. advanced by (Woodward
2003). Yet, we have seen that interventionist methodologies presuppose a causally
entrenched notion of an intervention that excludes one of two possible models that
equally account for the entanglement of two factors by assumption. The different
implications of the chain and the epiphenomenal model with respect to factor frame
expansions could now be taken as grounds on which such disambiguating causal
assumptions can be justified. Fennella’s chain model implies that scenario T 1 rather
than T 2 obtains and, thus, can be said to account for the fact that (CE) holds in our
exemplary case. As long as Shamus cannot come up with an account of why T 1
rather than T 2 has occurred that fares equally well as Fennella’s, a causal
assumption that excludes the epiphenomenal model in the vein of the interventionist
framework is well-grounded and justified.
7 Conclusion
This paper has answered one question and raised another. It has negatively answered
the question as to whether ambiguities of causal reasoning are a peculiarity of
causally analyzing (noisy) probabilistic data. Analyzing deterministic structures
against ideally homogeneous backgrounds such that deterministic dependencies are
exhibited in the data by no means guarantees unambiguous causal inferences. We
have found that inferences to causal chains are systematically empirically
underdetermined. Whenever deterministic data could stem from a chain, it could
equally be the result of a common cause structure. The finding that deterministic
chains cannot be positively identified on purely empirical grounds raises the
question on what other grounds inferences to deterministic chains could be justified.
We have seen that even though chain and associated common cause models are
empirically equivalent, they have different implications for expansions of the
empirical basis of a pertaining study. These differences could be resorted to in order
to justify causal assumptions that allow for a positive identification of causal chains.
However, this paper has at best provided some hints at how the inference to
deterministic chains could be non-empirically disambiguated. A general account of
how causal chains can be conclusively assigned to noise-free deterministic data has
to await another paper.
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